The aim of the present study was to compare the accuracy of the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) with that of the Structured Inventory of the Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) in detecting feigning of cognitive dysfunction in participants who received different types of coaching. Ninety undergraduate students were administered the TOMM and the SIMS and asked to respond honestly (controls; n = 30), or instructed to feign cognitive dysfunction due to head injury (n = 2x30).
Introduction
Evidence suggests that a nontrivial percentage of neuropsychological patients seeking financial compensation for cognitive dysfunction perform below their actual cognitive capabilities and/or engage in overreporting of symptoms (Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 2002; Sharland & Gfeller, 2007) . Different strategies have been proposed to investigate symptom validity in medicolegal cases. Some authors opine that a negative response basis can be detected by looking at inconsistent test performance on standard neuropsychological tests (Hartlage, 1998) . For example, attention and concentration mediate memory performance. If a patient performs well on memory tests, but poorly on tests of attention and concentration, this would be a possible indication of underperformance on some of the tests. Research, however, has shown that clinicians have great difficulty in detecting negative response bias. In a number of experiments, experienced clinical neuropsychologists were given neuropsychological test protocols from several individuals (Faust, Hart, & Guilmette, 1988; Heaton, Smith, Lehman, & Vogt, 1978) . Some protocols were from healthy participants who were instructed to feign cognitive dysfunction, while others were from patients with genuine brain injury. The clinicians were asked to judge which protocols were indicative of feigning. Although the neuropsychologists were fully informed about the purpose of the experiments, they often were unable to distinguish instructed feigners from genuine patients.
The finding that clinicians have difficulty in detecting negative response bias has inspired researchers to develop special symptom validity tests. These tests are usually based on the notion that people engaged in exaggeration and feigning have limited knowledge of true neurological and psychopathological symptoms (Larrabee, 2007) . Broadly speaking, there are two types of symptom validity tests (Iverson, 2006) . The first category consists of cognitive tests designed to measure underperformance or poor effort. These tests usually involve an easy memory task requiring only passive recognition. Feigners do not know that most genuine braininjured patients do quite well on simple recognition tasks. Because they want to convince the examiner that they suffer from brain damage, feigners will perform more poorly than true patients. One of the most widely used and best studied performance tests designed to detect cognitive underperformance is the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996) . The second category of symptom validity tests are self-report instruments that measure overendorsement of symptoms. These tests present patients with items that refer to atypical and bizarre symptoms that -in the eyes of laypeople -seem to be related to a particular syndrome or condition (such as brain damage). Because feigners want to appear suffering from a syndrome or condition, they will endorse substantially more of these atypical and bizarre items than genuine patients. A widely used self-report tool developed to measure overendorsement of symptoms is the Structured Inventory of the Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS; Smith & Burger, 1997) .
There is reason to believe that attorneys sometimes educate their clients about how to feign symptoms of brain injury prior to a neuropsychological evaluation (Youngjohn, 1995; see also Rosen, 1995) . Such "attorney coaching" may undermine the accuracy of symptom validity tests like the TOMM and the SIMS. Therefore, Youngjohn, Lees-Haley, and Binder (1999) argued that providing feigners with information about true patients and warning them not to exaggerate symptoms could lead to sophisticated feigning behavior. Meanwhile, systematic research on the effect of coaching on the accuracy of symptom validity tests is largely lacking (Blaskewitz & Merten, 2007; Gorny & Merten, 2005; Suhr & Gunstad, 2007) . What is known, though, is that when coaching is brief and only involves a superficial introduction to the to-be-feigned symptoms, its undermining effects on the ability of symptom validity tests to detect feigning are limited (e.g., Rose, Hall, Szalda-Petree & Bach, 1998) . On the other hand, one can also find examples in the literature where more extensive forms of coaching did lead to considerable drops in the efficacy of symptom validity tests to detect feigned disorders (e.g., Gunstad & Suhr, 2001 ). According to Powell, Gfeller, Hendricks, & Sharland (2004) there are two types of coaching.
Firstly, potential feigners can be educated about the symptoms of the to-be-feigned disorder. This type of coaching has been labelled "symptom-coaching". Secondly, they can also be provided with information on how to defeat symptom validity tests.
This latter type of coaching has been termed "test-coaching".
The present study was initiated to study the effects of different kinds of coaching on the accuracy of two widely used symptom validity tests, the TOMM and the SIMS, used to investigate negative response bias. Although there are hints in the literature that both the TOMM (see Powell et al., 2004) and the SIMS (see Jelicic, Hessels, & Merckelbach, 2006; Jelicic, Merckelbach, Candel, & Geraerts, 2007) are relatively immune to a moderate degree of coaching (symptom-coaching), we hypothesized that more extensive coaching (symptom-coaching plus test-coaching) would undermine the diagnostic accuracy of both instruments.
Methods

Participants
There were 90 participants (20 men) who volunteered to take part in a simulation experiment. They were undergraduate students, alumni, or employees of Maastricht University. Some of the students received course credit, while others participated in the experiment in return for a small financial compensation (approximately 8 US$). The experiment was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience of Maastricht University.
Mean age was 22 years (SD = 4.7; range 17-49 years). Participants with a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders were excluded from the study. None of the participants had any knowledge of psychological or psychiatric methods. They were randomly assigned to one of the three groups.
Materials
Participants were administered the TOMM and the SIMS. The TOMM (Tombaugh, 1996) contains two learning trials where the participant is presented with 50 line drawings of common objects, followed by a forced choice recognition task.
Feedback is given after each item. A Retention Trial, given 20 minutes after the last learning trial, consists of the forced choice task only. A score of less than 45 on the second learning trial (Trial 2) or the Retention Trial is considered indicative of underperformance. The SIMS (Smith & Burger, 1997 ) is a self-report measure designed to screen for feigning in five domains: low intelligence, affective disorders, neurological impairment, psychosis, and amnesia. It consists of 75 yes-no items that refer to bizarre and atypical symptoms and complaints. Total SIMS scores range from 0 to 75. Scores exceeding the cut-off of 16 are regarded to be indicative of overreporting. The Dutch version of the SIMS (Merckelbach & Smith, 2003) was used in the present study.
Procedure
Because the experimenter had to remain "blind" for the assignment of the participants to the three conditions, participants were given a blank envelope containing the instructions. To ensure random distribution of the three types of instructions, the envelopes were shuffled before the data collection started (i.e., before the first participant took part in the study). Participants were requested not to disclose the instructions to the experimenter before the end of the test session. In the control group (n = 30), participants were asked to do their best on the tests and to fill out the questionnaire honestly. In the symptom-coached feigning group (n = 30), participants were given a scenario about an accident in which they sustained head injury, and they were asked to act as though they had deficits resulting from that accident. These participants were specifically instructed to feign or exaggerate symptoms of brain injury in a believable way. They were also provided with information about cognitive dysfunction after head injury, and were warned that at least one of the tests they would receive was designed to catch them feigning. The scenario and instructions for the symptom-coached group were taken from Suhr and Gunstad (2000) . In the feigning group who received a mix of symptom-coaching and test-coaching (n = 30), participants received the same scenario and the same information about cognitive dysfunction after head injury. Like in the group that underwent symptom-coaching, they received a list of symptoms and were told that at least one of the tests they would receive was designed to catch them feigning. However, they also received the following instruction: Note that, instruments developed to identify faking of cognitive problems look just like normal tests and questionnaires. However, on these instruments patients with brain damage and healthy people who are not engaged in faking cognitive problems obtain similar scores. Therefore, try to score normally on instruments that could be designed to catch you faking! The participants in the three groups first completed the first two trials of the TOMM. They then had to fill out the SIMS. Finally, they were given the Retention Trial of the TOMM.
Results
Unfortunately, four participants (one in the control group, one in the symptomcoached feigning group, and two in the feigning group that underwent symptomcoaching plus test-coaching) had skipped a number of questions on the SIMS. They were therefore excluded from the analyses of the SIMS scores.
Mean total TOMM and SIMS scores of the three groups are presented in Table   1 . One-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) showed significant differences between the three groups with regard to scores on Trial 2 of the TOMM [F (2, 87) = 48.8; p <
.05]. Post-hoc analyses using Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) tests demonstrated that participants in the control group had higher scores on this subtest of the TOMM than those in the two feigning groups (both p's < .05), while there was no reliable difference in Trial 2 scores between the two feigning groups. An ANOVA also showed significant differences between the three groups with respect to scores on the Retention Trial of the TOMM [F (2, 87) = 52.6; p < .05]. Post-hoc comparisons using SNK tests showed that participants in the control group again had higher scores on this subtest of the TOMM than those in the two feigning groups (both p's < .05). In addition, the two feigning groups did not differ in their scores on the Retention Trial of the TOMM. An ANOVA also indicated significant differences in SIMS scores between the three groups [F (2, 83) = 93.7; p < .05]. Post-hoc analyses using SNK tests showed that participants in the control group had lower SIMS scores than those in the two feigning groups (both p's < .05). There was no reliable difference between the two feigning groups with regard to the SIMS scores. Table 1 about here Table 2 Some authors (e.g., Iverson, 2006) propose that multiple symptom validity tests should be used in forensic neuropsychological assessments. This notion is supported by the results of the present study. In our study, there were only two instructed feigners (both from the group that received a mix of symptom-coaching and test-coaching) who were able to score normally on all three symptom validity measures.
The present findings are well in line with previous studies. Powell et al. (2004) studied the effect of symptom-coaching and test-coaching on the ability of the TOMM to detect feigned cognitive dysfunction. Participants were asked to feign and received either symptom-coaching or test-coaching. Powell and colleagues found that 93 percent of the symptom-coached and 96 percent of the test-coached participants were correctly classified as feigners. Jelicic et al. (2007) examined the effect of symptomcoaching on the efficacy of the SIMS to detect feigning of cognitive dysfunction and found that 90 percent of the coached participants were correctly identified as feigners.
A few potential limitations of the current study warrant comment. Most of our participants were women. Although there is no a priori reason to assume that coaching leads to more sophisticated feigning behavior in men relative to women, the overrepresentation of female participants may have influenced our results. A more serious limitation pertains to the use of instructed feigners. In our study, as well as in many other studies, normal participants were instructed to feign cognitive dysfunction. Some authors argue that real life feigners have a greater motivation to feign in a sophisticated way than research participants who are instructed to feign cognitive dysfunction (Rogers, 2008) . Although one could argue that our findings may have limited external validity, there is evidence that students can mimic neuropsychological test scores of brain injured patients in quite a believable way (Haines & Norris, 2001) . Also, if symptom validity tests such as the TOMM and the SIMS appear to be relatively insensitive to coached feigning attempts of college students, their robustness might even be better in a forensic or clinical setting who often have lower levels of education.
There are hints in the literature that bona fide patients, especially those with severe cognitive dysfunction, do not always pass symptom validity tests (Teichner & Wagner, 2004) . Because all our controls were normal participants who were asked to respond honestly, the absence of false positives in our study may be somewhat unrealistic. To get a more realistic idea of specificity rates in medicolegal and clinical settings, future research on the efficacy of the TOMM and the SIMS should use an additional control group consisting of patients with documented brain injury.
Finally, one could argue that our test-coaching was somewhat superficial. We educated participants undergoing this type of coaching about the basic idea behind symptom validity tests. They were not provided with detailed information about the TOMM and the SIMS. In future studies, it would be interesting to investigate the robustness of the TOMM and SIMS using more thorough forms of test-coaching.
Notwithstanding the above limitations, it seems that both the TOMM and the SIMS are relatively robust to a combination of symptom-coaching and test-coaching.
Thus, both instruments may be used in the assessment of cognitive dysfunction in medicolegal cases. 
